Naturalizando a lógica
como o conhecimento de mecanismos reforça a inferência indutiva
Resumo
Este artigo naturaliza a inferência indutiva, indicando como o conhecimento científico de mecanismos reais proporciona grandes benefícios para essa forma de inferência. Apresento a ideia de que o conhecimento sobre mecanismos contribui para a generalização, para a inferência da melhor explicação, para a inferência causal e para o raciocínio probabilístico. Partindo da ideia de que alguns A são B, uma generalização de que todos A são B se torna mais plausível quando um mecanismo conecta A e B. A inferência da melhor explicação é fortalecida quando as explicações empregam mecanismos e quando as hipóteses explicativas são elas próprias explicadas por meio de mecanismos. As inferências causais na explicação médica, no raciocínio contrafactual e por meio da analogia também se beneficiam de conexões por meio de mecanismos, os quais também auxiliam em problemas relativos à interpretação, disponibilidade e cálculo de probabilidades.
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